Elements of Music Edition) edition by Straus Joseph Sheet music. Damon Ferrante - Piano Scales, Chords & Arpeggios Lessons with Elements of Basic Music Theory: Fun, Step-By-Step Guide for Beginner to Advanced Levels (Book & Streaming Videos) Piano Scales, Chords & Arpeggios Lessons. Hunter College, CUNY. “It Don’t Mean A Thing” (If It Ain’t Got That Swing) from SOPHISTICATED LADIES Copyright © , , by Joseph N. Straus All rights reserved. The book is organized into six chapters: (1) pitch; (2) rhythm and meter; (3) scales; (4) intervals. Elements of Music, 3rd Edition. Joseph N. . Previous editions. book cover. Elements of Music, 2nd Edition. Straus. © Music Fundamentals (Music).

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3rd edition by joseph n straus | elements of music 3rd edition pdf 2shared | isbn. elements of music 3rd edition | the basicelementsof music. "keeping the beat" or following the structural rhythmic pulse of the music. There are b=3rd. Harmony is often described in terms of its relative HARSHNESS. be more pleasurable if you first become familiar with some basic musical now, focus on learning the fundamental elements of music and their related terms.

Thus it is difficult to imagine how the paraphrase schema will avoid the nonsensical conclusion that The Rite of Spring contains several wrong notes. The solution to this problem seems to lie in an appeal to the work as independent of its various performances, but such an appeal seems unavailable to the nominalist.

For a recent defense of nominalist theories against some standard objections, see Tillman Platonism, the view that musical works are abstract objects, is perhaps the currently dominant view, since it respects more of our pre-theoretic intuitions about musical works than any of the other theories. On the other hand, it is the most ontologically puzzling, since abstract objects are not well understood.

Nonetheless, Platonism has been tenacious, with much of the debate centering around what variety of abstract object musical works are. The view is motivated by a number of features of musical practice, including the intuition that musical works are creatable, the attribution of various aesthetic and artistic properties to works, and the fine-grained individuation of works and performances e. Davies 37—43; Howell ; Stecker a: 84— In contrast to all these realist views stand those of the anti-realists, who deny that there are any such things as musical works.

An early proponent of such a view is Richard Rudner , though it is difficult to say whether he is best interpreted as an eliminativist or a fictionalist, the two anti-realist views currently on the table. According to eliminativists, there are no such things as musical works, and thus we ought to stop trying to refer to them. For critical discussion, see Predelli and Stecker According to fictionalists, the value of discourse about musical works is not truth, and thus we ought not to abandon the discourse despite the non-existence of its subject matter, but rather adopt a different, make-believe attitude towards it or perhaps we already do so.

See Kania c, b; for criticism, see Letts In the face of this, some theorists have pointed out that musical works are cultural entities, and thus the methodology appropriate to uncovering their ontological status might be quite different from that of general metaphysics Goehr ; S.

Davies a; D. Davies ; Thomasson , Kania c. There currently seems to be as much interest in the methodological questions as in first-order theorizing. For recent examples, see Kania c; D.

However, since the fundamentalist debate is about the basic ontological category to which works belong, resolving that debate may leave open many questions about the instantiation relation. Would producing harpsichord-like sounds on a synthesizer do just as well?

There have been two sources of widespread confusion in the debate over authenticity in performance.

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Something may be more authentic in one regard and less authentic in another S. Davies —5. That this is not the case is clear from the fact that an authentic murderer is not a good thing S.

Davies Thus, our value judgments will be complex functions of the extent to which we judge performances authentic in various regards, and the values we assign to those various kinds of authenticity. The central kind of authenticity that has been discussed is authenticity with respect to the instantiation of the work. Most agree that the fullest such authenticity requires the production of the right pitches in the right order.

Pure sonicists argue that this is sufficient e. Instrumentalists argue that such sounds must be produced on the kinds of instruments specified in the score e. Much of the debate is over what kinds of aesthetic or artistic properties are essential to musical works.

As such, the debate reflects a wider one in aesthetics, musical and otherwise, between formalists or empiricists, or structuralists , who believe that the most important properties of a work are intrinsic ones, accessible to listeners unaware of the historical and artistic context in which it was created, and contextualists, who believe that a work is essentially tied to its context of creation.

Stephen Davies has argued for a strong contextualism, claiming that one cannot give a single answer to the question of whether particular instrumentation is required for the fully authentic instantiation of a work.

The more properties of an authentic performance a particular work specifies, the thicker it is. Thus for some works typically earlier in the history of Western music instrumentation is flexible, while for others for example, Romantic symphonies quite specific instrumentation is required for fully authentic performances. In addition to the question of what constitutes authenticity, there has been debate over its attainability and value. Those who question its attainability point to our historical distance from the creation of some works Young We may no longer be able to read the notation in which the work is recorded, or construct or play the instruments for which it was written.

If so, full authenticity is not attainable. But we rarely have no idea about these matters, and thus we might achieve partial authenticity S.

Davies — Those who question the value of authenticity often target kinds other than work-instantiation.

Such arguments, though, have no consequences for the value of work-instantiation. Some argue that although we might attain an authentic instance of a work, the idea that we might thereby hear the work as its contemporaries heard it is wishful thinking, since the musical culture in which we are immersed enforces ways of listening upon us that we cannot escape Young —7.

Thus the point of such authenticity is questioned. In response, we may consider not only the possibility that we are in a better position to appreciate historical works than contemporary ones, but also the remarkable flexibility people seem to show in enjoying many different kinds of music from throughout history and the world S.

Davies —7. For an excellent overview of the authentic performance debate, see S. For an investigation of authenticity with respect to things other than instantiation of the work, see Kivy , Gracyk , and Bicknell Some recent work has, like the fundamentalist debate, taken a methodological turn, e.

Davies ; Dodd , A second area that may be independent of the fundamentalist debate is that of comparative ontology. For dispute over this framing issue, see Brown , , and Kania Just as classical works from different historical periods may be ontologically diverse, so may works from different contemporary traditions. Theodore Gracyk has argued that instances of works of rock music are not performances. Rather, the work is instanced by playing a copy of a recording on an appropriate device Stephen Davies has argued that rock is more like classical music than Gracyk acknowledges, with works for performance at the heart of the tradition, albeit works for a different kind of performance 30—6.

This has been a useful reminder that not all music is the performance of pre-composed works Wolterstorff — However, it must be noted that improvisation can occur within the context of such a work, as in the performance of an improvised cadenza in a classical concerto.

Some have argued that there is not as significant a distinction between improvisation and composition as is usually thought Alperson However, the arguments are not compelling. Though jazz is not necessarily improvisational, and very few jazz performances lack any sort of prior compositional process, the centrality of improvisation to jazz presents a challenge to the musical ontologist. The difficulty is to specify the work without conflating one work with another, since tokening the melody is not required, and many works share the same harmonic structure.

As a result, some argue that the performance is itself the work Alperson ; Hagberg ; S. Davies 16— One problem here is parity with classical music.

If jazz performances are musical works in their own right, it is difficult to deny that status to classical performances of works. This seems to multiply works beyond what we usually think is necessary. A third possibility is that in jazz there are no works, only performances Brown , ; Kania b. Julian Dodd a argues that the kinds of considerations adduced in favor of these views confuse questions of ontology with questions of value.

Jazz is ontologically like early classical music, according to Dodd: the focus of critical attention is the improvisatory performance rather than the composition it instantiates, but that composition is no less a musical work for that difference in critical emphasis.

Similar considerations might be adduced against the increasingly complicated ontologies of rock referred to above. Such arguments return us to debates about the methodology of musical ontology. Music and the Emotions The most widely discussed philosophical question concerning music and the emotions is that of how music can express emotions. The reason given for the restriction is usually that it is easier to understand how music with an accompanying text, say, could express the emotions evident in the text.

On the other hand, an important criterion for the evaluation of such music is how appropriately the composer has set her chosen text to music. So an accompanying text is clearly not sufficient for the musical expression of an emotion.

Thus, a better reason for initially putting such music to one side is that the interrelation of music and text, or other elements, is likely to be highly complex, and best approached with as well-developed a theory of the more basic phenomena in hand as possible.

Neither pieces of music, nor performances of them, are psychological agents, thus it is puzzling that such things could be said to express emotions. One immediately helpful distinction is that between expression and expressiveness, or expressivity.

Expression is something persons do, namely, the outward manifestation of their emotional states. Expressiveness is something artworks, and possibly other things, possess. It is presumably related in some way to expression, and yet cannot simply be expression for the reason just given. The first is that neither composers nor performers often experience the emotions their music is expressive of as it is produced.

Nor does it seem unlikely that a composer could create, or a performer perform, a piece expressive of an emotion that she had never experienced.

This is not to deny that a composer could write a piece expressive of her emotional state, but two things must be observed. The first is that for the expression theory to be an account of musical expressiveness, at least all central cases of expressiveness must follow this model, which is not the case.

The second is that if a composer is to express her sadness, say, by writing a sad piece, she must write the right kind of piece. In other words, if she is a bad composer she might fail to express her emotion.

This brings us to the second major problem for the expression theory. If a composer can fail to express her emotions in a piece, then the music she writes is expressive independently of the emotion she is experiencing. Those usually cited as classic expression theorists include Tolstoy , Dewey , and Collingwood A classic critique is Tormey 97— These theorists have been defended in recent discussions, however, from accusations that they hold the simple view outlined above.

See, for example, Ridley and Robinson — Some problems with this simple version can be overcome. For instance, some emotions, such as fear, require a particular kind of intentional object something threatening , yet there is no such object at hand when we hear fearful music. But the arousalist can broaden the class of aroused emotions to include appropriate responses to the expressed emotion, such as pity.

It can also be objected that many understanding listeners are not moved to respond emotionally to music. But the arousalist can simply restrict the class of listener to which his theory appeals to those who are so moved. The main problem with the theory seems more intractable.

Essentially it is that in order for a listener to respond appropriately to the music, she must discern the emotion expressed therein. This is most obvious when the response is a sympathetic, rather than empathetic, one. A sophisticated defense of the arousal theory is to be found in Matravers —, though see the second thoughts in Matravers Despite the problems of the arousal theory as the whole story of musical expressiveness, there is a growing consensus, thanks largely to the work of Jenefer Robinson , , that our lower-level, less cognitive responses to music must play some role in the emotional expressiveness we attribute to it.

However, this role is likely to be a causal one, rather than part of an analysis of what it is for music to be emotionally expressive. Again, though associations must play some role in some cases of expression—for instance, cases of particular musical instruments e. The main reason is the logical-priority problem, already encountered by the arousal theory. The expressiveness of music seems closely related to the resemblance between the dynamic character of both the music and the emotions it is expressive of.

It is implausible that funeral dirges might just as easily have been in quick-paced compound time. Even in such cases as the snare drum, it seems possible that the instrument was chosen for the battlefield in part due to the expressive character of its sonic profile. However, although Deryck Cooke and Leonard Meyer are often cited as proponents, it is not clear that anyone holds a full-blown version of the theory. The central problem is the great disparities between language and music, in terms of the ways in which each is both syntactic and semantic Jackendoff Several theorists have defended accounts of musical expressiveness known variously as resemblance, contour, or appearance theories e.

Stephen Davies argues that such theories hold music to be expressive in a literal albeit secondary sense of the term. We say that a piece of music is sad in the same sense in which we say that a weeping willow is sad S. Such uses are no more metaphorical than a claim that a chair has arms. Jerrold Levinson agrees that there is an important resemblance between the contour of music expressive of an emotion and the contour of typical behavioral expressions of that emotion.

He objects, however, that such an account cannot be the whole, or even the most fundamental part of the story Levinson a, b. He drives in a wedge precisely at the point where an appeal is made to the resemblance between the music and typical behavioral expressions.

He asks what the manner and extent of the resemblance between the two must be, precisely, in order for the music to count as expressive of some emotion. After all, as is often said, everything resembles everything else in all sorts of ways, and so one could point out many resemblances between a funeral march and an expression of joy, or for that matter a cup of coffee and sadness.

The resemblance theorist must give some account of why the funeral march, and not the cup of coffee, is expressive of sadness and not joy. If this is correct, then the resemblance the music bears to emotional behavior is logically secondary—a cause or ground of its expressiveness.

As a logical consequence, the imaginative experience prompted must include some agent whose expression the music literally is. But Davies now makes the appeal quite explicit and central, devoting as much space to explication of the response-dependent nature of expressiveness as to the role of resemblance To the extent that the response is one of imaginative animation, there will be agreement between Levinson and the resemblance theorist.

The first is in his refusal to accord a role to imagination in our response to expressive music. For Davies, the response of the appropriate listener upon which the expressiveness of the music depends is one of an experience of resemblance —2.

No further attempt at analysis is given, presumably because Davies believes this is the end of the philosophical line. Further explanation of our tendency to respond in this way to music will be in some other domain, such as the psychology of music.

Whether or not this is an advantage or disadvantage of the theory depends on the empirical facts about how we respond emotionally to music.

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On the second front Davies is more aggressive. He attacks the idea that we imagine a persona inhabiting the music, or giving rise to it in some way as the literal expression of its emotional experiences b; —90; see also Kivy —59; ; Ridley The simplest objection is that there is empirical evidence that understanding listeners do not engage in any such imaginative activity.

This is decisive if true, but there is plenty of room to quibble about our ability to test for the right kinds of imaginative activity, the selection of the subjects, and so on. A different kind of objection is that if the persona theory were true, expressive music could not constrain our imaginative activity in such a way as to yield convergent judgments of expressiveness among understanding listeners.

It is not clear even how we might individuate one such agent from another, re-identify an agent over time, and so on. These criticisms seem a little uncharitable. So Levinson can simply help himself to whatever level of specificity of emotions expressed the best resemblance account has to offer.

Both appeal to listeners with understanding of the kind of music under discussion. This raises the question of what counts as understanding a matter considered in section 4 , below.

One thing that cannot be appealed to in this connection, though, is an ability to hear the right emotional expressiveness in music, for this would render any account circular.

Levinson points out that one can appeal to everything but such understanding of expressiveness, and thinks that sensitivity to expressiveness will come along with the rest a: Aside from this, though, there is the fact that some apparently understanding listeners simply deny that music is expressive of emotion.

Levinson thinks we can reasonably exclude such listeners from the class whose responses are appealed to in the analysis of expressiveness, since only those generally disposed to hear expressiveness are reasonably appealed to in determining the specific expressiveness of a particular passage, which are the terms in which he puts his theory. A major burden of such a theory is to explain away the widespread tendency to describe music in emotional terms. This has been attempted by arguing that such descriptions are shorthand or metaphor for purely sonic features Urmson , basic dynamic features Hanslick , purely musical features Sharpe , or aesthetic properties Zangwill There are many problems with such views.

For one thing, they seem committed to some sort of scheme for reduction of expressive predicates to other terms, such as sonic or musical ones, and such a scheme is difficult to imagine Budd a: 31—6. For another, anyone not drawn to this theory is likely to reject the claim that the paraphrase captures all that is of interest and value about the passage described, precisely because it omits the expressive predicates Davies —4.

Perhaps Levinson, Davies, et al. It is a nice question, however, whether, if our musical culture fell into the grip of anti-expressivist formalism—in the future or the past—it would be appropriate to exclude ourselves from the reference class of listeners appealed to by such theories as those of Davies and Levinson. If so, this would point to a kind of high-level contextualism or cultural relativity about the expressiveness of music, making it a more contingent matter than most theorists imply.

It is not clear why we should respond emotionally to expressive music when we know that no one is undergoing the emotions expressed. I address these questions in turn. One might simply deny that we respond emotionally to music. Sharpe 1—83 , while stopping short of outright denial, suggests that our emotional responses to music are a much smaller component of our understanding experience of it than the philosophical literature on the topic would suggest see also Zangwill Peter Kivy goes almost all the way, arguing that those who report emotional reactions to music are confusing the pleasure they take in the beauty of the music, in all its expressive individuality, with the feeling of the emotion expressed.

When one listens to a sad piece of music, however, one knows there is nothing literally feeling an emotion of sadness, and thus it is puzzling that one should be made sad by the experience.

Part of the puzzle can be resolved by acknowledging that not all emotional responses broadly construed are cognitive Robinson ; — For instance, it is no more puzzling that one could be startled by a fortissimo blow to a bass drum than that one could so respond to a thunderclap. Similarly, we might respond non-cognitively to basic musical elements such as tension and release just as we do to the tension we observe in a balloon being over-inflated, or to the release of doves into the air.

As for higher-order emotional responses, there are at least two possible explanations. Davies —; —8. When surrounded by moping people, one tends to become sad.

One is not necessarily sad for the mopers, nor whatever they are sad about, if anything. The advantage is only slight because the question of how and why we respond emotionally to fictions is itself a philosophical problem of some magnitude.

Nonetheless, there are several theories available see entry on imagination, section 5. One difficulty with appealing to a solution to the paradox of fiction is that it is not clear that our emotional responses to the expressiveness of music are the same as those to emotionally expressive characters.

For instance, the standard example of an emotional response to music is being made sad by a funeral march, while the standard example of emotional response to fiction is something like to feel pity for a sad character.

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To obtain permission s to use material from this work, please submit a written request to Pearson Education, Inc. Music theory. SE44 Staff The five-line staff, pitches and notes, noteheads, ascending and descending motion, steps and leaps, ledger lines 1 Lesson 2: Keyboard Piano keyboard, black and white keys, letter names for notes, steps and leaps, octaves, piano fingering 7 Lesson 3: Treble clef Treble clef, accidentals sharp, flat, and natural , semitones, enharmonic equivalence 13 Lesson 4: Bass clef Bass clef, accidentals sharp, flat, natural , semitones 23 Lesson 5: Great staff Great staff 31 Chapter 1: Supplementary Lesson Alto clef, tenor clef, octave signs 8va and 8vb , octave designations, double flats, and double sharps 41 Chapter 1: Eighth notes and sixteenth notes Eighth notes and sixteenth notes, flags, beams 59 Lesson 8: Dots and ties Augmentation dot, dotted rhythms, ties, anacrusis 69 Lesson 9: Rests Rests 79 Lesson Duple meter and and meter, alla breve C, upbeat, downbeat, conducting patterns 89 Lesson Triple meter meter and its conducting pattern 97 Lesson Compound meter Compound meter, meter, and its conducting pattern Lesson Syncopation Syncopation, accent marks, ties, and subdivision Chapter 2: Supplementary Lesson Rhythmic values smaller than a sixteenth note, triplets, other duple, triple, and quadruple meters Chapter 2: Major scales other than C major Transposition, major scales with sharps, major scales with flats, circle of fifths iii iv Contents Lesson Major keys and key signatures Major keys and key signatures Lesson Minor scales other than A minor Transposition, minor scales with sharps, minor scales with flats, circle of fifths Lesson Minor keys and key signatures Minor keys, minor key signatures, relative keys, parallel keys Lesson Harmonic and melodic minor Harmonic minor and melodic minor scales Chapter 3: Supplementary Lesson Modes and the pentatonic scale Chapter 3: Interval size Intervals, melodic and harmonic intervals, interval size, compound intervals Lesson Seconds and thirds Interval quality, natural intervals, major and minor intervals, diminished and augmented intervals, enharmonically equivalent intervals Lesson Sixths and Sevenths Sixths and sevenths, enharmonically equivalent intervals, interval inversion Lesson Fourths and fifths, unisons and octaves Perfect intervals, fourths and fifths, unisons and octaves, interval inversion, enharmonically equivalent intervals Lesson Intervals in a major key Intervals in a major key, intervals and scale degrees, consonance and dissonance Lesson Intervals in a minor key Intervals in a minor key, intervals and scale degrees Chapter 4: Supplementary Lesson All intervals, doubly diminished and doubly augmented intervals, intervals in harmonic and melodic minor Chapter 4: Triads Triads root, third, and fifth , triad qualities major, minor, diminished, augmented , natural triads, chord symbols Lesson Triads in inversion Soprano and bass, inversion of triads root position, first inversion, second inversion , figured bass , , Lesson Triads in major keys Triad names, Roman numerals, triad qualities in major keys Lesson Triads in minor keys Triad names, Roman numerals, triad qualities in minor keys, and the effect of raising the leading tone Lesson Seventh chords Seventh chords, major-minor dominant seventh chords, inversions of seventh chords, dominant seventh chords in major and minor keys, figured bass symbols, chord names Chapter 5: Supplementary Lesson Qualities of seventh chords, natural seventh chords, inversions of seventh chords, and seventh chords in major and minor keys Chapter 5: Tonic and dominant Harmonic progression, tonic harmony, dominant and dominant seventh harmonies, harmonizing a melody Lesson Expanding I and V Embellishment and prolongation nonharmonic tones , passing tones, neighboring tones, passing chords V and viio6 , neighboring chords, the cadential Lesson Approaching V Dominant preparation chords Lesson Tonic and dominant Lesson Each brings a different feel to your classroom, meaning students are less likely to get bored.

Lisa Kirlick Managing Editor: In addition to the question of what constitutes authenticity, there has been debate over its attainability and value. After this, an analysis is made of intervals and chord progressions. As a result, some argue that the performance is itself the work Alperson ; Hagberg ; S.

This is done to guarantee that neither mother, nor experimenter bias the infant's response. In the face of this, some theorists have pointed out that musical works are cultural entities, and thus the methodology appropriate to uncovering their ontological status might be quite different from that of general metaphysics Goehr ; S.

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