DESTROY THE OPPOSITION PDF

adminComment(0)
    Contents:

destroy the opposition jamie lewis pdf Destroy The Opposition Jamie Lewis Pdf 27 Reads 0 Votes 1 Part Story. meorohomi By meorohomi Ongoing. Read story Destroy The Opposition Jamie Lewis Pdf 40 by meorohomi with 11 reads. download. Destroy The Opposition Jamie Lewis Pdf As it so happens, Destroy the Opposition, in my opinion, is one of the more worthwhile powerlifting eBooks on the entire market. At $20, it might be considered a.


Destroy The Opposition Pdf

Author:LONG SCHUBACH
Language:English, German, Hindi
Country:Jordan
Genre:Academic & Education
Pages:734
Published (Last):27.12.2015
ISBN:631-3-70104-625-1
ePub File Size:25.57 MB
PDF File Size:17.85 MB
Distribution:Free* [*Sign up for free]
Downloads:34502
Uploaded by: RACQUEL

was pleased with that progress but I want to try something else and liked the look of Destroy the Opposition. If you are on a program you are. Read Online Now destroy opposition by jamie lewis Ebook PDF at our Library. Get destroy opposition by jamie lewis PDF file for free from our online library. bestthing.info >5/3/1 for powerlifting book >chaos and pain destroy the opposition book.

The division of intensity between the two weeks of the microcycle is highly intentional. You can take another look at it for yourself to see that Lewis has clearly structured things in such a manner as to facilitate both intra-week and inter-week recovery.

Specificity Lewis has done a pretty damn good job of specificity in my opinion. What a concept, right? Lift heavy to lift heavy. That said, there is still some in there which is nice because we all know that most of you are going to go off of your program and do it anyways.

The Young Turks in Opposition

The one criticism I have of this program in terms of specificity is the emphasis on overhead pressing and rowing.

This is very, very typical in American powerlifting programming and I strongly disagree with it. However, for a competitive powerlifter, by toning down the overall overhead pressing volume and rowing volume, not necessarily eliminating it mind you, you can do more deadlifting and benching which is flat out more beneficial to the powerlifter.

With less overhead pressing, this template could easily feature thrice weekly benching which I am a big fan of. Which do you think will do most to help your total: deadlifting twice a week and rowing once per week or rowing twice a week and deadlifting once per week?

Overload This program features basic progressive overload. Every six weeks you take a new max. As you get stronger, the program calls on you to lift heavier weights.

This is a perfectly legitimate way to organize programming for younger guys in my opinion. You see, even though this program features five times per week frequency, this is only due to the way Lewis is dividing the workload. Instead of doing full body, the routine is split into separate days. That is not what Lewis is doing here.

This is different than, say, the Bulgarian method where you might do a total of six or seven working reps in an entire workout, but you repeat that workout five or six times a week or more.

I think some of the workouts are kind of pointless. Nothing substantial is going to happen with that. It is just a bit too much. While the Texas Method does feature higher relative intensities on the volume work, it also less overall work and still buries lots of people with sub-par recovery. I suspect this program would do the same even. Compare the total volumes and you can see that, once you factor in all the accessory work, this program is substantially more overall work.

Practical experience shows that this will crush some people even if they do the minimum amount prescribed by Lewis. However, for you younger guys, this is ambitious, but the fatigue management is still appropriate. They might just opt to do the maximum amount of sets every single time. More is better, right? Some outliers might fall below the minimum bound of the range and others above the maximum. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.

Siikrii Hanioglu.

Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1. Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti 2. Turkey—Politics and government— H37 Udovitch and Bernard Lewis, who approached me about presenting my research on the Young Turks before the English-speaking public.

Professor Michael Cook has given invaluable assistance by his most able guidance throughout the preparation of this text. I also wish to thank Ms. Ziircher; and also Mr.

Benjamin Fortna, Ms. Niliifer Hatemi, Mr. Ronen Raz, and Mr. Mehmet Ulucan, who contributed to this study in various ways. Princeton June M.

This page intentionally left blank Contents Note on Transliteration, xi 1. Introduction, 3 2. Organizational Transformation of the CUP, , 8.

Conclusion, Abbreviations, Notes, Selected Bibliography, Index, ix This page intentionally left blank Note on Transliteration The sources and names in Ottoman Turkish are rendered in modern Turkish usage without transliteration, as is normally done in modern Turkish writing. The Greek sources and journal names are given in Greek script. Slavic sources are transliterated according to the modified Library of Congress transliteration system. There was no standard use for Albanian in Latin chararacters at the turn of the twentieth century, and the original usage found in the sources is preserved and is not converted into modern Albanian usage.

Since the Ottoman intellectuals wrote their names differently when they published articles or works in languages written in Latin characters, one might find a single person's name written in two or more different ways. In this book, the original usage is preserved. It begins by examining the inception of the original CUP nucleus in and continues to expose in detail the internal workings of the movement until I chose to write about this phase of the CUP because it is seminal and because a clear demarcation can be made in , at which time the network collapsed, leading to the formation of drastically different organizations.

I believe that such an indepth study is long overdue, not least because the Young Turks had a formative and lasting impact on the modern Turkish state.

The CUP, an outgrowth of the Young Turk movement, constituted the major ruling power in the Ottoman Empire between and except for a brief interlude; the founders of modern Turkey, including the first three presidents, serving from to , were former CUP members. Clarification of this period is thus both fundamental and essential to serious studies of events since Too many scholars have overlooked the movement prior to the revolution of , preferring to concentrate their efforts on the aftermath— the Young Turks in power.

Moreover, the body of scholarship on events prior to is marked by four major methodological flaws. The CUP was an underground organization from the formation of its first nucleus in until the revolution of In virtually every domain, one can find evidence to show that whatever was claimed in the official organs of the movement was contradicted by decisions taken by its executive branches.

For instance, while its official organs were promoting an Ottomanist policy, the central committee was shifting to Turkish nationalism. Also, Turkish journals published by the CUP and official organs published abroad in other languages for European public consumption consistently promoted divergent themes.

Thus far researchers have acknowledged only the struggle for leadership, especially that between Murad Bey and Ahmed Riza. Abundant material reveals the fallacy of this presumption. The CUP was an umbrella organization until and was overflowing with member groups whose only common agenda was the dethronement of Abdul hamid II. Nor did the CUP maintain a constant identity, for it passed through ongoing transformations involving its ideology, its leadership, the ethnic origins of its leaders, and its membership; it is even plausible to speak of at least three different organizations having the name CUP in common.

Therefore the CUP of bore little resemblance to the CUP of except that a scattering of individual members remained from the earlier period. Third, the vague and inaccurate use of the term Toung Turk, especially in the writings of non-Turkish scholars, has created confusion, because many activities have been falsely attributed to the Young Turks.

Destroy The Opposition: Background and Context

There were many independent groups working in the Ottoman Empire against the regime of Abdiilhamid II, and only some of these had dealings with the Young Turks. The fourth methodological failure found in every study to date is that each examined the CUP as if it were a single-faceted phenomenon.

But this subject presents at least three essential and interrelating aspects for historical analysis. It is a topic of Ottoman political history; it was an affair in the diplomatic history of Europe; and it was a watershed in Ottoman intellectual history.

Regarding work by various scholars, we may observe that for many years Turkish scholars approached this topic from the mind-set of the "new history thesis" prevalent in early modern Turkey, according to which all late Ottoman events were analyzed starting from a single critical question: Why did the members of certain movements fail to accomplish missions that were later successfully realized by the current regime?

Why I’m a Fan of Destroy The Opposition by Jamie Lewis

This theme prompted excellent research into the Tanzimat movement by various scholars even within these constraints. During the War for Turkish National Independence in , CUP leaders attempted to dominate the nationalist movement, which deepened the estrangement between the existing CUP and the new republican leaders, although all had once been members.

In active CUP members openly opposed the new regime in Turkey and were repulsed, and at this point the emerging negative approach to the CUP was firmly locked into place.

Hikmet Bayur, assigned to write the history of the Turkish revolution, used the fact that he was a grandson of Kamil Pasha, the most outstanding opponent of the CUP after , to lend authority to his heavily censorious examination of the movement. Also his criticisms of the followers of Ahmed Riza and of the activist-nationalist faction were excessive and heavy-handed.

All the works by Turkish scholars paid scant attention to the Young Turk Weltanschauung and viewed the CUP as a mere political organization. With the exception of a single article by Tunaya,6 the ideas of the Young Turks have been examined only by Mardin, who accurately scrutinized their convictions as expressed in the official organs of the CUP. As for works by non-Turkish scholars, the greatest obstacle seems to have been the material. Even Ramsaur's classic work contains few original sources, those being letters written to him by various former CUP members in response to his own questions.

Because Ramsaur based his examination of the Young Turks and the CUP on European sources and did not even look into the official organs of the movement, his conclusions reflect only European public opinion about the Young Turks. Later the topic was subjected to analyses made within more theoretical contexts through the application of various theories. The first such study to be published was by the Soviet historical writer Petrosian, who endeavored to prove that the Young Turk revolution was a bourgeois uprising.

Other than bringing to light a few hitherto-unknown Russian documents, this study contributed nothing to the field. Even less may be said for articles written by Quataert, who analyzed the movement and 6 The Toung Turks in Opposition the revolution by focusing on economic conditions. My examination of the early phase of this movement is intended to fulfill four objectives, while relying heavily upon the private papers of the CUP.

First, the dissection of the organizational framework, with special focus on internal factions within the CUP network, is a necessary preliminary to a systematic definition of the movement. Second, in distinguishing the CUP from other opposition movements and studying relations with them when relations existed, I uncover some of the other existing opposition forces while further defining the CUP and the Young Turk movement.

Third, I examine the European diplomatic affair with the Young Turk movement within the larger context of Ottoman and European diplomatic histories.

Fourth, since the Young Turk Weltanschauung propelled the CUP and continued to wield a profound influence even in much later periods, I have attempted to uncover this ideological phenomenon and trace its roots and development. This was the underpinning and the single relatively constant element in this secret society. It is essential to scholars for that reason, as well as for its enduring impact on Turkish culture and intellectual life. However, it is difficult to find any evidence of these connections in relevant scholarly studies published since Nevertheless, the Young Turk and westernization movements were indisputably intertwined, and the latter, starting as early as the late eighteenth century, played an undeniable role in shaping the Young Turk Weltanschauung.

In a book written nearly fifty years after the onset of the Ottoman westernization movement, the following question was posed: "Was the gravitation toward western ways precipitated by spontaneous attraction, or was it the fruit of wise counsel and foresight by Ottoman statesmen? After the Ottomans' humiliating defeats by western powers, self-doubt and questioning became the order of the day.

Initially, Ottoman intellectuals promoted their conclusion that Ottomans had been overcome by "infidels" who had mastered the "new technology. However, contacts with Europe and sallies into modernization in the form of imitating the West produced unexpected results in the mid-nineteenth century. A consequence of intellectual borrowing from Europe was the emergence of a distinguished group of intellectuals who envisaged an ideal society antithetical to the one they inhabited.

For Ottoman statesmen this was an awful as well as unlooked-for outcome. To acquire western knowledge, the Ottoman government sent students to Paris to study the latest scientific advances, renting mansions so as to house them outside the city. The students were required to speak only Turkish and Arabic among themselves and were instructed by the most capable French professors so that "they might not be unduly influenced by the detrimental values of a foreign culture.

As soon as Ottoman intellectuals became exposed to western life and culture, they perceived profound differences between these and their own civilization. In brief, although Europe was the smallest continent, it became, with scientific advances, the hub of modern power.

In other words, nations all around the world were obliged to depend upon the science of Europe. The Europeans are even struggling to rule the air as they had once mastered the sea. In short, it is obvious that they, in addition to multiplying the branches Ideological Roots of the Toung Turks 9 of knowledge and science, will also succeed in inventing new sciences as well as maintaining the old ones.

Many memoranda given to the Ottoman sultans during this transition period were prefaced by such phrases as "Although it can be called improper for the Muslims to imitate unbelievers [kefere];" following this, they would underscore the necessity of such imitation due to "special circumstances.

As one Ottoman officer declared in a fictitious dialogue: "Although I have spent my life on battlefields, the skill of Christians in producing weapons of war and superior stratagems is beyond my comprehension.

Until then Ottoman political writers had analyzed every situation relative only to their own political system, and their proposed solutions were consistent with the boundaries of the status quo. A pamphlet set forth the question "Why has the world fallen into anarchy from its formerly tranquil state? Solutions were drawn from the examples of that earlier time.

Gibb so brilliantly expounded, "The new culture is spoken 10 The Young Turks in Opposition of by the Turks as 'gharbi' that is 'western' or 'occidental' and is contrasted with the 'sharqi' that is the 'eastern' and 'oriental,' " and. Aided by the general spread of education among both sexes and all classes, it [Islam] has relegated to the background the old dogmatic Muhammedanism, just as in Western Europe the old dogmatic Christianity has been rudely shaken by the popularisation of science and the wide diffusion of knowledge.

The question might be raised why—given that the initial response of Egyptian intellectuals such as Hasan 'Attar, al-Jabartl, and Rifa'ah Ran' alTahtawl to western culture was identical to that of Ottoman intellectuals in the capital—no similar transformation should have been realized in Egyptian culture.

The answer is threefold. First, superwesternization in the Ottoman capital was led by non-Muslim inhabitants and followed by Muslims. Second, in contrast to Egypt, Ottoman statesmen held their empire to be geographically European and believed that their destiny lay with Europe.

Third and most important, the Turkish ulema, due to their close adherence to the establishment, seemed unable to produce ideologies that challenged the westernization movement, leaving fervent popular feeling against westernization with no strong guiding ideology.

The Islamic revivalist movements, such as the modernism of al-Afgham and 'Abduh, and the Salafiyyah movement, which emerged in Egypt and Syria, had little influence on the Turkish intelligentsia of the Empire until Contemporary Science and Its Impact on Ottoman Thinking Clearly the enormous changes in the mental life of Ottoman intellectuals that accompanied their embrace of western social and cultural values precipitated far-ranging results.

One oft-used word, science, was credited for this perceived western supremacy. Ottoman statesmen proffered various explanations, such as "philosophy," to explain western supremacy31; however, when it came to comparisons between the Ottoman Empire and the West, science was invariably designated as the cause. After comparing an "uneducated" individual with an "intelligent" one, he commented that a similar comparison might be drawn between a state that "applied modern civilization" and one that "refused to apply it.

At that time, of course, the Chinese emperor became aggrieved because his military was ignorant of new technological warfare. Had not the Chinese stubbornly insisted on preserving their imperfect civilization, would they have been subjected to humiliation by a few thousand foreigners?

Scholarly discourse now studied questions from a "scientific" viewpoint rather than invoking religious proofs. Here is a typical argument comparing geology and history as tools for acquiring knowledge: Just as it is unacceptable for man to be ignorant of his origins, whether physical or moral, it is shameful for him to neglect the study of geology.

By means of the study of history, the lives and customs of previous peoples may be understood, but the science of geology uncovers thousands of centuries of natural history. History consists of reports and stories passed down through generations by man, but the science of geology cannot be influenced by the changing conditions of communication. Similarly, the effective administration and continued prosperity of the Empire began to be reexamined in relation to science: The progress of a nation results from increase in its population, agriculture, art, capital, and commerce, as well as from the endeavors of its people, and this progress depends upon science and reason and requires the acquisition of greater knowledge.

In this sense, populism appears as a new specter haunting European democracies, as active risk, causing serious concerns. Unfortunately, the growing concern does not coincide with policies aiming at finding viable solutions, as the center-right parties and governments believe that the only solution to the crisis is to adopt austerity measures and Social Democrats have not yet found effective alternatives.

This essay will attempt to shed light on some aspects of current populism phenomenon with particular focus on its modern manifestations.

Firstly, it is useful to attempt a classification of the concept of populism. According to Frank Deckeri populism is a strong stand against the status quo, it appeals to lower social groups and it is a phenomenon of social crises of modernization in the sense that there is a systemic review in nearly every form of economic, cultural and political development, using simplified shapes and models of analysis.

In other words, a key feature of populism is the manichean method of addressing the problems and history at a black and white way of thinking. According to that method, diversity, complexity, relativism, uncertainty, doubt, pluralism, rational arguments and rationality should not exist.

In particular, stereotypes and views of traditional roles are used in order to achieve the maximum impact on a significant part of population which feel insecure. According to Decker, populism and modernization are nearly the same thing.

Populists call the disadvantaged for enlisting even outside the boundaries of institutional normality and claim their support in order to subvert the existing political system. The enemy - friend figure, as once introduced by Carl Schmitt, revives a strange bipolar composition. On the one hand is the nation, the people, the underprivileged, our own, and on the other, the enemies of the nation, immigrants, foreigners, the privileged, the moneylenders.

The complex dipole is followed by a strong willingness of institutional obsolescence, which ultimately legitimizes lawlessness behaviors. Because populism is always addressed to the disadvantaged, any political program aimed at empowering marginalized social groups contains a certain extent of populism.

In every political system, these two processes coexist, but in different proportions. According to Laclau the first example was expressed in Greece during the widespread redistribution period of Andreas Papandreou during the s while the second during the modernization period of Costas Simitis The first is a populist and the second is an institutional pole but the predominance of one of them do not necessarily eliminate the other.

We could also refer to Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasserv who distinguish three interdependent features of populism. These are primitivism a weakened form of nationalism , autarchy and popular sovereignty. Right wing populists often invoke the overthrow of popular sovereignty in order to accentuate the catalytic effect of migration while at the same concept, leftist populists emphasize on the dissolution of the national state because of the memorandum imposed by the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Commission.

In fact, both cultivate a myth, as stated by Michael Ignattieff. The tragedy of modern state sovereignty is that currently, there is not any country in the world that is absolutely sovereign in this sense. Populism appears in democratic regimes and grow through the existence of a strong denunciation of the implementing policies.

In most occasions solutions proposed by the parties that develop populist speech are inapplicable but they are presented as the only alternative, particularly in the impasse posed by the economic crisis. It is obvious that the factors that favor the emergence of populists in Greece have found fertile ground during the last four years due to the economic downturn.

Either by enabling broad intersectoral agreements over policy issues or by freeing national policy- making from the burden of oligopolistic coalitions— a social democratic and a neoliberal scenario respectively.Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable. This is the hallmark of appropriate intermediate training. The more openly this despotism proclaims gain to be its end and aim, the more petty, the more hateful and the more embittering it is. The proletarian is without property; his relation to his wife and children has no longer anything in common with the bourgeois family relations; modern industry labour, modern subjection to capital, the same in England as in France, in America as in Germany, has stripped him of every trace of national character.

If anywhere they unite to form more compact bodies, this is not yet the consequence of their own active union, but of the union of the bourgeoisie, which class, in order to attain its own political ends, is compelled to set the whole proletariat in motion, and is moreover yet, for a time, able to do so.

GIGI from Scranton
I relish sedately . See my other articles. I take pleasure in paragliding or power paragliding.
>