learning, reading, note taking, writing—is worth your while. There are, of course, some Chapter 3 introduces the ski Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist. This classic is the benchmark against which all modern books about Nietzsche are measured. When Walter Kaufmann wrote it in the immediate aftermath of. Nietzsche, philosopher, psychologist, antichrist. by: Walter Arnold Kaufmann. Publication Borrow this book to access EPUB and PDF files.

Walter Kaufmann Nietzsche Philosopher Psychologist Antichrist Pdf

Language:English, French, Portuguese
Country:South Africa
Genre:Health & Fitness
Published (Last):22.01.2016
ePub File Size:16.89 MB
PDF File Size:17.59 MB
Distribution:Free* [*Sign up for free]
Uploaded by: ARGENTINA

Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. WALTER A. KAUFMANN. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, Pp. xl, Suppose you meet a. legends woven around Nietzsche and to analyze the break Kaufmann, Walter. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist,. Antichrist. Princeton. Read Nietzsche PDF - Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist by Walter Kaufmann Princeton University Press | This classic is the benchmark.

Of course, your seeing of the whole of the book comes in degrees, as you get to know it more and more. But as you turn the last page, it is still the same whole you picked up at the shop or the library — you saw the whole superficially then; you are gradually seeing the whole in greater depth right now; and, depending on the depth of the book, you may or may not decide at some future point that you have exhausted the whole book.

Philosophers examine their life, ideas, and assumptions not only occasionally, but full time. Such holism is in tension with the analytic and mechanistic frame of mind which interprets us as parts of parts, holisim by contrast seeing us as wholes in wholes. But there is nothing besides the whole.

Walter Kaufmann (philosopher)

Freed from the delusion of theism, the thinker becomes free for that experience of divinity which had only been obscured by a belief in a deity. Divining the direction of autonomy is the task of Without Guilt and Justice, and autonomy is undermined by the shadow of God which makes us think like slaves, cowering before imaginary entities, thereby ignoring all the actual signs indicating the possibility of transcending human limitations, and finding higher limitations, as far removed from human limitations as human limitations are removed from simian limitations.

In making the world divine, 17 it need not be transcended by a God in order to be oriented, but by the same token, immanence is no longer the lifeless fact imagined by the materialist. The very first courtesy we readers owe Nietzsche is therefore to strive to read his published works as a whole, to whatever depth we are able.

According to Kaufmann, Heidegger is an example of someone who fell into the former error,25 while Nietzsche's sister Elizabeth is an example of someone who fell into the latter. In contrast, Kaufmann demonstrates in the sixth chapter of Nietzsche how the emerging doctrine of Will to Power dawned upon Nietzsche as the difference-preserving common root holding the Apollo-Dionysus opposition together in tension, which provided the focus necessary for Nietzsche to divine the way forward in his attempt to fathom both himself and his world as a whole.

Kaufmann thus locates the Will to Power doctrine at the heart of his Nietzsche interpretation and the key to understanding his work as a whole.

Nietzschean sublimation, unlike Hegelian sublation, is not a system, nor even a systematic method, but an art form, a knack, a skill: in short, a style. A thinking partner in actual dialogue is a very different thing to an interlocutor who is a dogmatic ideologue; a stranger who wants to chat is quite different to someone who knocks on your door with a memorized script in mind.

He is not denying the obvious utility of systems in thinking, and the value of machines for life per se, only warning that a slavish dependence on their virtues can easily lead to forgetting of their limitations, distracting attention from the vital informalities of actual existence.

But as meteorologists and economists alike well know, an unthinking reliance upon formal modeling is a dangerous thing, and a robust common sense along with a subtle intuition of informal elements always operative in reality are invaluable aids to utilizing systematic understanding without mistaking it for the whole of understanding, which must be admitted to include its informal aspect.

Kaufmann was the first to elaborate this theme of sublimation in chapter seven of his Nietzsche, although Freud had obviously also noticed the importance of this notion. A sublimation in chemistry is a phase transition of a substance which skips a usual intermediary phase.

Water, for example, exists in three phases: solid, liquid and gas. Under certain conditions, ice can turn into steam without passing through a liquid phase. Under intense pressure, hydrogen gas can solidify into a metal.

These and other examples of sublimations led Nietzsche to adopt sublimation as a metaphor for the way in which humans are able to transmute destructive conflicts between the drives into creative forces.

The ancient Greeks achieved many paradigmatic sublimations: the invention of 38 sport, sublimating the drive to war, especially civil war, into passionate but harmless competition; the tragedy, sublimating pain and suffering into an aesthetic phenomenon through the invention of the theater; and the sublimation of political rivalry in Platonic dialogue, the reasoned discourse of rational men still charged with the passion of an irrational fight, but channeled into the clarity and thoughtfulness of rational dialogue.

These elaborations concerning sublimation in Nietzsche depend upon his understanding of the whole person as an ensemble of interacting drives conducted by the mind like a conductor conducts an orchestra, but also like a rod on a building conducts lightning. Such organic development was for Nietzsche no mere academic exercise, but rather one which enfolded and eventually engulfed his whole life.

As such, how a text makes you feel as you read it is no less significant than what it makes you think, and in fact the two are closely connected. Like his master, the author never shows a trace of a sense of humor. Kaufmann then fled Nazi Germany in at the age of eighteen, and went on to take a Ph. He then taught at Princeton until his premature death in at the age of Both Kaufmann's and Nietzsche's works must be read "in stereo" with the stories of their lives, and as confessions, both conscious and unconscious, by their authors.

For Heidegger interprets Nietzsche as the last of the metaphysicians, whereas Jaspers and Kaufmann are in agreement that he ought rather to be seen along with Keirkegaard as the first of the existentialists. The article is largely devoted to a discussion of Eric Podach, an unusual Nietzsche biographer who published five books on Nietzsche in the s, and then a sixth in Voigt in as The Madness of Nietzsche.

It should also be noted that later examinations of Nietzsche for signs and traces of lues had completely negative results.

As Kaufmann reaffirms clearly in his later work on Nietzsche, biographical and intellectual matters cannot be disentangled in Nietzsche, any more than Nietzsche's thought can be reduced to "nothing but" symptoms.

Emotional stress he experienced as physical pain. May this be his best remedy, that he might see with his own eyes one who makes himself whole. This holism is reconciled with Nietzsche's anti-essentialistic attack on "the soul superstition" by way of an account of individuality in which energies are distributed through a pattern of drives without having to be knotted into an ego, weaving instead a life whose integrity as a whole devolves upon that whole being in each and every part in its own way, not in being reducible to an identity such as an agent, ego, soul or brain.

Nietzsche admits that like Wagner he was a decadent, but unlike Wagner he admitted this decadence to himself, and struggled with it.

1. Life and Works

If our evolutionary past is active in us in the present, then the animals give us symbolic access to ourselves. We can become tame cows and sheep, or live dangerously like eagles and panthers.

We can become homo insectus and toil in honeycomb skyscrapers, or we can scale the heights like mountain goats: these metaphors could be multiplied endlessly. Neither Kaufmann nor Nietzsche wanted to be followed unquestioningly: on the contrary, this is precisely what Nietzsche warns us against.

Perhaps there is even a sense in which hostile critics like Brinton66 might have appealed to Nietzsche, afraid as he was of sycophants and disciples, and always exhorting his readers to think for themselves. But the theme of friendship runs deep in Nietzsche, and he often addresses his readers as his friends, and this good will is a significant aspect of most appreciative readers' experiences of Nietzsche who become "friends of lento".

Although in places he does distance himself from his friend Friedrich, 67 Kaufmann devotes a great deal of energy defending Nietzsche from ill-informed and judgmental critics, and rebutting groundless gossip.

It is because biography and thought are entangled in ways of which we cannot be entirely conscious that questions such as the syphilis issue and the Nazi appropriation are important.

These texts' ideas cry out to be tested in attempts and experiments in real life. This is not quite the absolute "us" of the conclusion of Hegel's Phenomenology, but it is more than the mere "me" that shows through in section 4 of chapter 1 of Without Guilt and Justice pages , revealing Kaufmann's third flaw, sometimes called his "humanism. Just as these first two volumes appeared in the U. The first decade of the twenty-first century has been an exciting one for readers of Nietzsche in English translation.

Journal of the History of Philosophy

Not at all. With other authors, new translations of a work usually do supplant older ones. But this is not the case for Nietzsche, for the work being translated is sufficiently nuanced, subtle and personal that a reader can only ever benefit from comparing varying translations.

Not only do standard moral commitments lack a foundation we thought they had, but stripped of their veneer of unquestionable authority, they prove to have been not just baseless but positively harmful. Unfortunately, the moralization of our lives has insidiously attached itself to genuine psychological needs—some basic to our condition, others cultivated by the conditions of life under morality—so its corrosive effects cannot simply be removed without further psychological damage.

Still worse, the damaging side of morality has implanted itself within us in the form of a genuine self-understanding, making it hard for us to imagine ourselves living any other way. Thus, Nietzsche argues, we are faced with a difficult, long term restoration project in which the most cherished aspects of our way of life must be ruthlessly investigated, dismantled, and then reconstructed in healthier form—all while we continue somehow to sail the ship of our common ethical life on the high seas.

The most extensive development of this Nietzschean critique of morality appears in his late work On the Genealogy of Morality, which consists of three treatises, each devoted to the psychological examination of a central moral idea. In the First Treatise, Nietzsche takes up the idea that moral consciousness consists fundamentally in altruistic concern for others. He begins by observing a striking fact, namely, that this widespread conception of what morality is all about—while entirely commonsensical to us—is not the essence of any possible morality, but a historical innovation.

In such a system, goodness is associated with exclusive virtues. There is no thought that everyone should be excellent—the very idea makes no sense, since to be excellent is to be distinguished from the ordinary run of people.

Nietzsche shows rather convincingly that this pattern of assessment was dominant in ancient Mediterranean culture the Homeric world, later Greek and Roman society, and even much of ancient philosophical ethics. It focuses its negative evaluation evil on violations of the interests or well-being of others—and consequently its positive evaluation good on altruistic concern for their welfare. Such a morality needs to have universalistic pretensions: if it is to promote and protect the welfare of all, its restrictions and injunctions must apply to everyone equally.

It is thereby especially amenable to ideas of basic human equality, starting from the thought that each person has an equal claim to moral consideration and respect. BGE The exact nature of this alleged revolt is a matter of ongoing scholarly controversy in recent literature, see Bittner ; Reginster ; Migotti ; Ridley ; May 41—54; Leiter —; Janaway 90—, —9; Owen 78—89; Wallace ; Anderson ; Poellner , but the broad outline is clear enough.

Afterward, via negation of the concept of evil, the new concept of goodness emerges, rooted in altruistic concern of a sort that would inhibit evil actions.

For Nietzsche, then, our morality amounts to a vindictive effort to poison the happiness of the fortunate GM III, 14 , instead of a high-minded, dispassionate, and strictly rational concern for others. That said, Nietzsche offers two strands of evidence sufficient to give pause to an open minded reader. Second, Nietzsche observes with confidence-shaking perspicacity how frequently indignant moralistic condemnation itself, whether arising in serious criminal or public matters or from more private personal interactions, can detach itself from any measured assessment of the wrong and devolve into a free-floating expression of vengeful resentment against some real or imagined perpetrator.

The First Treatise does little, however, to suggest why inhabitants of a noble morality might be at all moved by such condemnations, generating a question about how the moral revaluation could have succeeded.

The Second Treatise, about guilt and bad conscience, offers some materials toward an answer to this puzzle. Nietzsche begins from the insight that guilt bears a close conceptual connection to the notion of debt. The pure idea of moralized guilt answers this need by tying any wrong action inextricably and uniquely to a blamable agent.

As we saw, the impulse to assign blame was central to the ressentiment that motivated the moral revaluation of values, according to the First Treatise.

Thus, insofar as people even nobles become susceptible to such moralized guilt, they might also become vulnerable to the revaluation, and Nietzsche offers some speculations about how and why this might happen GM II, 16— These criticisms have attracted an increasingly subtle secondary literature; see Reginster , as well as Williams a, b , Ridley , May 55—80 , Leiter —44 , Risse , , Janaway —42 , and Owen 91— In such cases, free-floating guilt can lose its social and moral point and develop into something hard to distinguish from a pathological desire for self-punishment.

Ascetic self-denial is a curious phenomenon indeed, on certain psychological assumptions, like descriptive psychological egoism or ordinary hedonism, it seems incomprehensible , but it is nevertheless strikingly widespread in the history of religious practice. One obvious route to such a value system, though far from the only one, is for the moralist to identify a set of drives and desires that people are bound to have—perhaps rooted in their human or animal nature—and to condemn those as evil; anti-sensualist forms of asceticism follow this path.

As Nietzsche emphasizes, purified guilt is naturally recruited as a tool for developing asceticism. Suffering is an inevitable part of the human condition, and the ascetic strategy is to interpret such suffering as punishment, thereby connecting it to the notion of guilt.

GM III, 15 Thus, Nietzsche suggests, The principal bow stroke the ascetic priest allowed himself to cause the human soul to resound with wrenching and ecstatic music of every kind was executed—everyone knows this—by exploiting the feeling of guilt. Consider, for example, the stance of Schopenhauerian pessimism, according to which human life and the world have negative absolute value. From that standpoint, the moralist can perfectly well allow that ascetic valuation is self-punishing and even destructive for the moral agent, but such conclusions are entirely consistent with—indeed, they seem like warranted responses to—the pessimistic evaluation.

That is, if life is an inherent evil and nothingness is a concrete improvement over existence, then diminishing or impairing life through asceticism yields a net enhancement of value. While asceticism imposes self-discipline on the sick practitioner, it simultaneously makes the person sicker, plunging her into intensified inner conflict GM III, 15, 20— While this section has focused on the Genealogy, it is worth noting that its three studies are offered only as examples of Nietzschean skepticism about conventional moral ideas.

Nietzsche tried out many different arguments against pity and compassion beginning already in Human, All-too-human and continuing to the end of his productive life—for discussion, see Reginster , Janaway forthcoming , and Nussbaum Nietzsche resists the hedonistic doctrine that pleasure and pain lie at the basis of all value claims, which would be the most natural way to defend such a presupposition. From that point of view, the morality of compassion looks both presumptuous and misguided.

It is misguided both because it runs the risk of robbing individuals of their opportunity to make something positive individually meaningful out of their suffering, and because the global devaluation of suffering as such dismisses in advance the potentially valuable aspects of our general condition as vulnerable and finite creatures GS ; compare Williams 82— For him, however, human beings remain valuing creatures in the last analysis.

It follows that no critique of traditional values could be practically effective without suggesting replacement values capable of meeting our needs as valuers see GS ; Anderson , esp. Nietzsche thought it was the job of philosophers to create such values BGE , so readers have long and rightly expected to find an account of value creation in his works.

It is common, if not altogether standard, to explain values by contrasting them against mere desires. Consider: If I become convinced that something I valued is not in fact valuable, that discovery is normally sufficient to provoke me to revise my value, suggesting that valuing must be responsive to the world; by contrast, subjective desires often persist even in the face of my judgment that their objects are not properly desirable, or are unattainable; see the entries on value theory and desire.

Only we have created the world that concerns man! Some scholars take the value creation passages as evidence that Nietzsche was an anti-realist about value, so that his confident evaluative judgments should be read as efforts at rhetorical persuasion rather than objective claims Leiter , or relatedly they suggest that Nietzsche could fruitfully be read as a skeptic, so that such passages should be evaluated primarily for their practical effect on readers Berry ; see also Leiter Others Hussain take Nietzsche to be advocating a fictionalist posture, according to which values are self-consciously invented contributions to a pretense through which we can satisfy our needs as valuing creatures, even though all evaluative claims are strictly speaking false.

First, while a few passages appear to offer a conception of value creation as some kind of legislative fiat e. Second, a great many of the passages esp. GS 78, , , , connect value creation to artistic creation, suggesting that Nietzsche took artistic creation and aesthetic value as an important paradigm or metaphor for his account of values and value creation more generally.

While some Soll attack this entire idea as confused, other scholars have called on these passages as support for either fictionalist or subjective realist interpretations. In addition to showing that not all value creation leads to results that Nietzsche would endorse, this observation leads to interesting questions—e. If so, what differentiates the two modes?

Can we say anything about which is to be preferred? Nietzsche praises many different values, and in the main, he does not follow the stereotypically philosophical strategy of deriving his evaluative judgments from one or a few foundational principles. A well-known passage appears near the opening of the late work, The Antichrist: What is good?

By Werner Dannhauser. His analysis of the relation--the quarrel--between Nietzsche and Socrates pp. Dannhauser is thorough, balanced and lucid throughout his treatment of these two elusive figures in the history of philosophical thought.

Nietzsche, philosopher, psychologist, antichrist

The author believes that the quarrel between Nietzsche and Socrates illuminates the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns and also, to a more limited degree, that between philosophers and poets pp.

With the recognition of this difficulty clearly before him, Dannhauser succeeds in laying out the fundamental areas of agreement and disagreement between these two thinkers, preserving his original formulation of the quarrel between the ancients and moderns while adding significantly to our understanding of the nature of that quarrel.

As presented in the study, Nietzsche characterizes Socrates as follows: Socrates corrupts mankind by teaching that the world is rational and that reason should rule in the soul and in the city. Socrates' dialectical way shows the traditional gods and laws of all nations to be inconsistent and therefore defective. By elevating reason, Socrates succeeds in subordinating the nobler irrational instincts to the baser instinct of reason pp.In some cases, these values reinforce one another.

One obvious route to such a value system, though far from the only one, is for the moralist to identify a set of drives and desires that people are bound to have—perhaps rooted in their human or animal nature—and to condemn those as evil; anti-sensualist forms of asceticism follow this path. And so you can, nearly all of it, online. He lived on until , when he died of a stroke complicated by pneumonia.

More positively, he presented Nietzsche's ideas about power as one of the great accomplishments of modern philosophy, arguing that his conception of the "will to power" was not a crude apology for ruthless self-assertion but must be linked to Nietzsche's equally profound ideas about sublimation.

For example, the account of honesty and artistry explored in sections 3.

LUCIENNE from Baton Rouge
I do like reading novels unbearably. Please check my other posts. I'm keen on british baseball.