Majiteľ prvej porevolučnej a veľmi úspešnej veľkopredajne TETA v Bratislave si tiež . knihy „Mafia v Bratislave“ už krátko po vydaní v kníhkupectvách chýbali. The Slovak mafia constitutes various organized crime groups in Slovakia, controlled primarily under mafia control in Slovakia include the biggest cities ( Bratislava, Banská Bystrica, . Create a book · Download as PDF · Printable version. Title: Post-communist mafia state: the case of Hungary / by Bálint Magyar. Other titles: A bestthing.info [The invisible reality—Fascistoid mutation in present-day Hungary] (Bratislava.
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One of the most interesting factors concerning Balkan mafia groups today is moved goods along the line between Turkey, Budapest and Bratislava, a city. member of a criminal organization of camorra– mafia type, that was organized and led . Bratislava, Republic of Slovakia, EAST AIR COMPANY Ltd,. Bratislava . a Post-Communist Mafia State, edited by Bálint Magyar and Júlia Vásárhelyi, CEU ), http://www. bestthing.info reality—Fascistoid mutation in present-day Hungary] (Bratislava: Kalligram, ).
Organized crime is first of all an organization: There's also a third element, together with coercion and assistance, which characterizes contemporary mafia groups: This invisibility is the main explanation for the persistence of these criminal organizations at the end of the wars which they have often at least in part generated.
How is it possible, asks Strazzari16, to lump together narco- traffickers, smugglers of counterfeit medicines which indeed cover a demand, even through a fraud , and white-collar criminals? The first answer is that not every criminal or illegal activity is the product of clever and sophisticated planning, but quite often comes as the 16 Strazzari. Thus global organized crime and transnational crime have indeed a close relation with globalization, since only in the last twenty years has the shape assumed by new conflicts and financial world made possible these evolutions from a war economy to a legal economy.
Yet it is not a simple consequence of globalization, or we would conclude simplistically that global organized crime is nothing but a distorted outcome of the overcoming of state authority unable to fight properly local criminal organizations — which is actually yet to be demonstrated. We should instead agree with Kaldor18, and say that transnational crime is rather the effect of a new kind of relationship between the state, organized violence and common criminality.
And this mixture usually expresses itself through the dynamics of state disintegration or fragmentation former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Colombia , in a context which makes it difficult to distinguish legal from illegal, public from private, politics from economy, civic from military or paramilitary. The story goes that at this point came the time, for these warlords, to just clean the money, the hands, and the face.
Organized Violence in a Global Era Stanford: Stanford University Press, The dimension of its action; 2. Its ability for exploiting the open nature of transnational business; 3. The relevance that the criminal agenda has in firing political instability, or even in detonating uprising and revolts which enhance the resilience of violent structures. To conclude this introduction, let's clarify some general remarks.
The origins of contemporary transnational mafias resides only partly in globalization and in faster communication and transports of money, people, and goods; to a greater extent, the origins are in the evolution of paramilitary or criminal organizations involved in new kinds of wars.
Wars which often lead to fragile peaces and weak governments, where peace-building actions are inadequate to intervene in those sectors where state power is nonexistent. It stands to reason that in similar situations the liberalization recipes forged by international financial institutions — and often slavishly implemented by post-war states — have not helped in improving the legal economy, and rather granted organized crime with new profitable ways for money-laundering through financial investments.
Let's save these considerations for our conclusions, and move now to the central subject of this presentation. Why can these general tendencies of contemporary transnational organized crime help us to better understand Balkan mafia groups, and their links with northern Europe and Scandinavia?
We can think at least at two reasons: Scandinavia was a traditional destination for Yugoslav emigrants, and refugees; not by chance was it one of the European regions in which UDBA's interests focused. It was another demonstration that nationalism was not the destiny nor the choice of Balkan peoples, but a strategy of defense of the existing hierarchy of power, with a different outcome for each country.
Nationalism then as the shadow, thicker or less so, of contemporary democracy. The current international economic crisis could boost organized crime also in countries very seldom associated with this kind of crime.
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According to the last report of the Institute for Security and Development Policy19, the crisis has fortified organized crime in the Baltic Sea, in particular for what concerns human trafficking and cigarette smuggling.
Cigarette routes are mainly controlled by Balkan organized crime, which manages a chain starting in the Netherlands, and passes through Macedonia, the Greek port of Thessaloniki, and ends in a northern European destination, usually Sweden. However, more generally, the answer that Europe is giving to the crisis is made by a balance of financial severity and welfare deregulations, and still lacks a common model of law enforcement against organized crime, which slows repressive and investigative actions.
While organized crime, as the famous quote says, never sleeps. Balkans organized crime from the s to the 21st century Many stereotypes linger about the binomial relation between mafia as a concept and the Balkans. During the wars of the s, these stereotypes became part of the orientalistic interpretation of the war portrayed by many Western media outlets: Institute for Security and Development Policy, Available online at the url: Europas bequemes Vorurteil Darmstadt: It took over a decade after the end of the war to see the first researches openly problematizing the relations between post-war Balkan states and organized crime as a mutual and profitable agreement.
As we will see, during the s, in most former Yugoslav countries — but also, for instance, in Albania22 — public power was based on a mixture of kleptocracy, organized crime and alleged patriotism, as a consequence of internal reorganization of political power and of external interests and disagreements. But this was not the first chapter in the mafia connections between Scandinavia mainly Sweden and the Balkans, which we will now discuss.
Failing to mention this part of the story would mean that we could fail to understand some of its later evolutions. Balkan criminals in Scandinavia during the Cold war During the Cold War, as mentioned above, Scandinavia became for a certain period a safe haven for political refugees from Yugoslavia.
The Socialist regime targeted both common criminals and wanted killers, on the basis of their connivance with fascist regimes and armed groups during the II World War. One thus might also note with some despair that news regarding people and institutions involved in organized crime affairs are more and more being confined to judicial reporting or specialist publications.
But the intelligence and other operations by the Yugoslav secret service, UDBA, saw spies and assassins start to follow the routes of emigration, increasing the flourishing Serbian-Croat underworld in many Western European towns: Frankfurt, Stockholm, Paris, Vienna, Milan, and so on.
Sweden saw a large influx of emigrants during the 60s and 70s, when the "Arbetskraftsinvandring" took place, granting citizenship in exchange for labor a program similar to the Gastarbeiter one.
And Tito himself, half-Slovene and half-Croat, had seen in the Ustashe a mortal threat to his Partisan movement during the war.
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Thus it is not a surprise that the higher number of UDBa clandestine retaliatory acts, including threats and assassinations, were directed towards Croat immigrants.
Sweden, along with Spain and Italy, has been indeed a crucial hub for the European web of former Ustasha and neo-fascist dissidents and armed groups. This was the first major crime committed in Sweden by a non-Swede. He was later arrested, and freed during a prisoner exchange with the hijackers of a plane in Spain, in Widening the spectrum of our reconstruction, we must recall that the 70s marked a crucial turning point in the history of Cold War organized crime: The closure of this route brought Turkish drug lords to look for new distributors.
They quickly encountered the warm and professional embrace of the Sicilian mafia, which was thus able to convert its logistics structure for cigarette contraband to heroin smuggling. This strategic agreement between groups in Turkey and Italy made the routes of the Balkans crucial to the supply chain of Western Europe.
Traditionally, this route went from Istanbul to Sofia or Skopje, and then branched towards Belgrade, Zagreb or Ljubljana, and then to the continent, with Vienna and Milan as initial destinations. Often drugs reached northern Europe by boat, and were distributed by local smugglers.
He was later killed in a skirmish with Serb rebels in Krajina in July of that same year, at the age of The war: In the meanwhile, internal and external factors opened the way for war in Yugoslavia, making traditional routes more complex to follow, and opening new ones to provide arms to those Republics facing the international embargo.
Thus, rather than in drug smuggling — a sector in which Balkan groups held a minor importance until the eve of the millennium — we must look for the origins of transnational Balkan organized crime in finding the routes for the supply of arms from the countries where emigrants lived.
But this must not surprise: Here it is a kind of illegal action necessary to the survival of the state itself, not different from the examples provided above. This deal, signed in , provided to Croatian forthcoming army the heavy weapons they needed, and guaranteed to Maniero pistols and light guns for his robberies.
Arkan himself sought in Italy new allies to perform his actions during the Bosnian War. As reported in the inquires by Italian prosecutors, he made an arrangement with Francesco Schiavone, boss of the rebellious Camorra clan of the Casalesi, and ironically nicknamed after a tiger too the book character Sandokan, aka the Tiger of Malaysia, by Emilio Salgari. Arkan did not just ask him weapons for his paramilitaries; he primarily requested Schiavone's help to solve two crucial problems: During those years, criminal organization, mafia groups and local clans acquired a central role in supporting political leaders, doing the dirty work and profiting from plundering, smuggling, the black market, drug and human trafficking across the renewed Balkan state borders.
Mondadori, , Sandokan firstly intervened to stop his Albanian friends, allowing to Arkan the opportunity to conduct a bloodier war against Muslims in Bosnia; later, he stimulated his bank contacts and managed to send the money in Serbia disguised as humanitarian aids. In exchange, the entrepreneurs affiliated to Schiavone's clan residing in all Italy had the opportunity to download at the lowest price factories, companies, shops, farms, thus spreading in half Serbia.
We should not be surprised to acknowledge how the war was, for the most part of them, the continuation of their criminal action by other means. Balkan organizations showed themselves as useful and quick partners, because the instability in their home countries guaranteed a faster development, wider possibilities for money-laundering, uncertainty of penal action.
Belgrade itself, at the turn of the millennium was a bombed-out city transformed into a battlefield for gangs, where bosses and smugglers went to wash dirty money financing the building of new apartment blocks and commercial centers in the Novi Beograd section of the city. The leading faction was then the feared Zemun clan, located in the so-named suburb north of Belgrade. As became clear, many members of this organization were originally part of a disparate but well-sponsored section of the army: Aside from the golden triangle, the second route opened to substitute the original Balkan one was still starting in Bulgaria, but it sought nothing more than to ship drugs on Turkish trucks crossing Yugoslavia.
A sophisticated chain of small middleman smugglers, under the control of Kosovar groups allied with the Italian 'Ndrangheta, moved goods along the line between Turkey, Budapest and Bratislava, a city which became for a certain period — roughly defined, the 90s — a strategic hub of drug smuggling towards Northern and Western Europe. That is the reason why at the end of the Balkan Wars up to the last fighting in Macedonia in the Albanian mafia, literally arising from nothing, became one of the leading groups in the international arena.
The consequences of the war, the connivance of political elites, the large corruption and the scarce range of intervention of international forces made them crucial partners in international trafficking in the Mediterranean Sea.
An example may help to understand the scenario here: Not by chance did this come after the collapse of Albanian financial system in , after the pyramid schemes scandal occurred, and many high-rank coverings were dismissed. This change was sensible for two reasons: On the other hand, the institutional stabilization of Balkan states gave inquirers more freedom in investigating those relations between politics, finance and organized crime that had lurked for years behind the official affairs of state.
Especially in Serbia, some decisions marked a firm line: But these police operations by no means eradicated organized crime in Serbia. In this country, and in the other Western Balkan states. In Italy, the capos came to understand that public bombings and audacious killings in broad daylight could have a boomerang effect: This unwanted visibility in turn made doing deals more difficult, forced potential allies to become enemies, and increased the chances of being prosecuted before an approving public.
In less than six months, Serbian police arrested the supposed perpetrators: Police accused him of having received 1. The time of Arkan and Legija has passed: Meanwhile, in Sweden: Assets and routes set during the conflicts were disposable to be converted in new business of drugs from Middle East and people from Eastern Europe and Northern Africa. In the war years in Yugoslavia fellow countrymen in Northern Europe went on playing a role at the bridgehead for drug and cigarettes routes coming from the Balkans through Adriatic and Dutch ports.
Cigarettes, as mentioned above, became the key good. That year, the number of cigarettes smuggled into Sweden more than doubled, reaching close to 40 million according to Swedish customs. A single Macedonian lorry intercepted at the port of Trelleborg was found to be carrying 16 million cigarettes. The first one comes from the other side of the Atlantic, with US cigarettes arriving in the port of Antwerp, in the Netherlands, where they were not subject to duty because they were directed to a third country, usually Macedonia.
In the lengthy Italian investigation, two names repeatedly appeared: By the end of the inquiry, the Italian weekly, Espresso reported that the Office of the Prosecutor in Naples and Bari had put together 4, pages of evidence against them, including recorded conversations and testimonies. He was arrested in the UK in , and sentenced to 14 years for instigating to murder, illegal gambling and tax evasion.
And we know, when it comes to these bloody showdowns, the power balance inside organized crime is swinging. We must also note the presence of new varied and sophisticated of Balkan groups, some of them members of the Pink Panthers, a criminal group able to act on an international arena and to accomplish high-level robberies: This means we are no more talking of drug smugglers and arms dealers: Pink Panthers are directly in contact with 'upper crust' downloaders and banks.
We are now talking about recent times. Speaking of organized crime relations between Scandinavia and the Balkans is to discuss juridical issues in response to criminal webs between EU and non-EU states, a line along which reside the fortunes and the glories of many of these new mafia leaders. The last Treaty, although far from untangling the knot, set some juridical basis for the identification of a criminal organization with some 33 Hell's Angels and their counterpart, the Bandidos, are two motorcycle gangs quite powerful in Sweden, and are usually considered by local sources as the organizations more similar to other countries' organized crime.
According to it, organized crime can be identified by 11 criteria, 4 of which are mandatory: The crime implies more than 2 persons; 2. The offenses have been committed repeatedly over a long period; 3. The offenders are suspected of the commission of serious criminal offenses; 4. To make an example, it does not authorize direct involvement of foreign police departments on the territory of another member state, making investigations longer and harder.
The Treaty foresaw the constitution of a dedicated committee, which is still far from being properly operative.
More improvements came with the Stockholm Program, signed in to set the guidelines for justice and internal affairs for member states during following five years. It gave more power to Europol and recognized a common anti-corruption standard. The persisting problem in these pieces of legislation is bureaucracy, while contemporary mafia groups tend to specialize their area of operation to make trafficking faster. So we can have specific groups managing drugs import, others controlling its distribution, others monopolizing human trafficking and so on.
A network performs an operation, and then the goods pass into a different network for the following step, thus making the work of inquirers more difficult without a complete cooperation between European polices and institutions. Repressive actions are normally aimed at discouraging people from doing something by punishing them afterwards, but can work only if crimes are discovered to have been committed, if the criminals are seized, if the trials are quick, if inmates cannot interact with one another and with the organization, and so on.
Repressive measures of this kind include the introduction of new specific criminal offenses, as the crime of mafia-type association, broader investigative powers, ability to penetrate the protection-shield of mafia- men, their patrimonial assets and economic activities, and regulations concerning financial transactions and money laundering.
Complementary actions are instead policies addressing civil society and public administration, and only indirectly the mafia. These strategies promise to be particularly effective against transnational crimes, because it has a vital need of bureaucrats, businessmen, IT experts, corrupted officials and so on, with links in the very center of state systems, when they're not already controlling it the so-called narco-states: The economic crisis and the consequences on Balkan organized crime in Sweden Turning to the future, the evolutions of these historical connections between the Balkans and Scandinavia, concerns the possible consequences of the financial crisis on organized crimes.
An intuitive hypothesis is that criminals have in fact benefited from the crisis. As a matter of fact, European laws follow three different approaches: This latter system is based upon a precise definition of the crime, which may be worsened by aggravating circumstances. However, in these penal codes there is no mention of specific rules about the participation in criminal organizations, which usually falls under the allegation of "conspiracy", but may cause loopholes if crime's presence would increase.
That is the reason why organized crime groups could benefit from this period of financial crisis in these countries.
In particular, the absence of the crime of mafia type association impedes the prosecution of members of these trafficking operations, who often come under trial for minor crimes only. As a matter of fact, Sweden and Norway have put emphasis on fighting economic crime since the mids, whereas other European countries and the United States have devoted more attention to organized crime.
This choice is useful in the fight against business crime, and is maybe a reason that can explain why the profit gained by drugs and human trafficking in the Baltic Sea are almost impossible to be invested in loco. Since the best traffic is that one which guarantees the highest income at the lowest risk, Balkan gangsters prefer to bring money back into the former Yugoslavia Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia or elsewhere where financial controls are less tight.
This state of things makes the study of distribution chains and racketing networks a priority in understanding the real situation of organized crime in Sweden. Unfortunately, we lack data, since there is not a specific archive in this country and scholars and investigators must rely on surveys made by public authorities and police officials.
Thus the extent of actual crime in relation to reported crime is largely unknown. As the gangs have matured, they have diversified away from their traditional trafficking routes through the Balkan countries.
Petersson explained how crime bosses have used the money and expertise gained from earlier operations to open up new networks in Poland, the Baltic states and Belarus, which indeed were strengthened with the entrance of the former in the European Union.
Magnus Ramebaeck, a Swedish prosecutor who has handled a large number of cigarette smuggling cases, confirms this hierarchy. The people he prosecutes are typically drivers from Poland or the Baltic, but "from our investigations we know that we have not yet reached the key ex-Yugoslav persons high up in the hierarchy. Arrested suspects have talked about former Yugoslavs during questioning, but their information is not enough on its own for us to take action against these people.
What is certain is that the alleged leaders prefer now to live in Serbia as businessman, covering their income from alleged illegal activities by money-laundering in white economy or through creative finance. Still, it is unclear if Serbian and Albanian groups are collaborating in managing these routes, if they are covering different sectors of trade or, again, if they will assist in new killings.
According to this article, seven of the 10 men charged several, Serbian were found guilty after the heist. It also came out the Serbian intelligence had warned their Swedish counterparts several weeks earlier that plans for a major criminal operation were in the works. And maybe this kind of spectacular robbery, calculated with military precision, represents the last kind of viable traditional organized crime actions in the contemporary world.
But it is not by chance that this event happened in Sweden, where criminal can rely on a solid web of relations and cover-ups. Widening the spectrum of this recognition, it is possible to focus on the general situation in this country; indeed, after , Sweden was often presented as a happy island as concerns the economy: Then the biggest part of organized crime, and specifically drug, weapons and human trafficking, tries instead to hide, making itself invisible or masking itself behind a gentle face.
And following these stratified and complex routes, touching many countries and constantly balancing between finance, gray and real economy, does not just need a strict cooperation between international police forces. It also needs integration strategies towards migrants and citizens of the peripheries, and law-enforcement actions towards the institutions, through complementary and repressive actions.
Conclusions This presentation aimed at described the current relations of organized crime groups acting between Scandinavia and the Balkans, with brief historical contextualization.
Speaking about this kind of transnational mafia was meant to shed light on the tendencies of contemporary criminal groups, which are no more confined to a specific territorial area: A collateral conclusion, for those who still believe that the problems in the Balkans depended on ethical issues, and that humanitarian wars could constitute a proper solution, is that the facts controvert their hopes.
The solution Europe provided to the instability in the Balkans has been to adopt the principle of self-determination, granting support for independence to groups on a national basis, and de facto confirming their ethnic claims.
But we also saw how nationalism was often a shield to hide more profitable business, with Kosovo as the main example of a tendency in other hard peace-keeping missions in the world: This hard power reaction also led, most memorably, to the brief danger of a real conflict when NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, which was believed to be sheltering Milosevic or helping in other ways with his defense of the territory.
The present analysis concentrated on Scandinavia, a region that has always been a preferred destination for Yugoslav emigrants.
We underlined at least three phases in the mafia relations with the Balkans.
The first one gravitates around the fight between Ustasha organizations, which usually financed themselves from organized crime, robberies, and drug smuggling - and the countermeasures of the Yugoslav secret service UDBA. The second stage arrived with Yugoslavia's collapse and the Wars of Secession, which changed the strategic assets of drug and weapon smuggling, forcing Italian and Turkish mafias to deviate from the traditional Balkan Route.
Another prohibition, another field of opportunity for gangsters and organized crime thus lies in guns. As described above, it was based on the change of course of American cigarettes to Macedonia through Netherlands, then moving to Northern Balkans and Montenegro.
Joka, Arkan's successor in controlling smuggling in Sweden, made up an empire upon cigarettes, which are heavily taxed in this country. The third one is the current period, when the game has moved to the next level. Now, transnational crime, in which Balkan mafias are born, has become the norm. The re-opening of the Balkan route and the growing prominence of the Serbo-Montenegrin and Albanian criminal organizations show the ability of these groups to adapt to contemporary world, to new technologies and new markets.
Their burgeoning relationships with cocaine producers and mafias in South America, for example, have commanded great attention in the last two years. This is also the reason why is better to handle with care the meaning of recent arrests, like those accomplished with the international police operations "Checkmate" and "Domino" in Serbia, Italy and Croatia.
The "invisibility" organized crime gained from fragmentation and the multiplication of boundaries, often benefiting from political protection and presenting a gentler businesslike face, makes possible, for criminal webs, to continue their work also while the boss is fugitive.
There is no need to recall that, in Italy, mafia bosses went on managing their criminal cupola also when they were jailed or hidden in some refuge, communicating with the outside world though mouthpieces or coded messages like Provenzano's pizzini. However, saying that the power of organized crime organizations resides in its relations with politics and economy is not sufficient to define a solution.
Thus analysis and policies contrasting organizing crime must keep into account every level of criminal action: Without forgetting that also this last one may be of support to criminal action through the so-called white-collar crimes: The European Union started only at the eve of the millennium to understand the threat of transnational crime, but have indeed defined some useful basis with the Lisbon Treaty and the Stockholm program.
Some European countries already make use of a new category of analysts, investigators and politics experts in the mixed routes of organized crime, namely those who knew a longer tradition of organized crime. But other countries still lack tools and expertise required by a similar task. European Union formation projects, and exchange programs between police corps are highly required, at least similar to the training courses American DEA held with Serbian anti-drug police before their successful maritime operation off of Uruguay.
Since it was created, Europol's investigation lead to some signifying discovers - making us foresee that a deeper involvement of regional polices may help in unfolding some "awkward relation" between economy, politics and organized crime. One of the major results of these investigations is that criminal webs in Europe usually rely on weak states, which are used as fulcrum of criminal operations.
States compromised by a widely corrupted leadership, sometimes itself active in managing smuggling trades and profits; and states where the larger part of the traffics towards Europe is stored and shipped through well-functioning distribution and selling chains.
It could be useful to list these states, as a conclusion. Co chystate do buducna? Velka vdaka za Vas ohlas, potesilo najma ocenenie tych rozhovorov. Mrzi ma, ze Vas nepotesim, ale neplanujem v tejto teme pokracovat, lebo som uz svoju databazu vycerpal a zda sa mi, ze som povedal, co som povedat chcel. Mozno sa v buducnosti objavia aktualizovane reedicie alebo ine mutacie. Ale snad Vas zaujmem aj niecim inym. Ohlasy na Martinus. Jaja , Mafia na Slovensku. V tieni mafie.
Homepage O mafii inak. Comments to writing. Texty v prekladoch. PEN International. Texty z ciest. Moje texty na internete. Moje video-rozhovory a TV blogy. Feminizmus ako tretie zlo. Coelho is wrong.
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Havel I. Havel II. Gorila a spisovatelia I. Gorila a spisovatelia II. Gorila a spisovatelia III. Obchody so strachom.Brussels Commission Parliament Council. This state of things makes the study of distribution chains and racketing networks a priority in understanding the real situation of organized crime in Sweden. Die Erfindung des Balkans: The president is weighing — and reflecting — different opinions among his top advisers, including Stephen Miller and his son-in-law Jared Kushner.
By doing so, they would go back to the company owned by the complainant.