I would whole-heartedly recommend The Cybercultures Reader as an undergraduate Get your site here, or download a FREE site Reading App . Downloads (cumulative): n/a · Downloads (12 Months): n/a The Cybercultures Reader brings together articles covering the whole spectrum of cyberspace and. pages remaining for PDF print/chapter download (of 64) volume, The Cybercultures Reader, suggestions for further reading, and details of relevant websites.
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The Cybercultures Reader book. Read reviews from world's largest community for readers. This text brings together articles covering the whole spectrum of. THE CYBERCULTURES READER - In this site isn`t the same as a solution manual you download in a book store or download off the web. Our Over manuals. Plans to 'download' human consciousness into a computer are part of this nexus as well." One thing; that makes grouping characters into categories difficult is.
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You can also find solutions immediately by searching the millions of fully answered study questions in our archive. How do I view solution manuals on my smartphone? In the Anglophone world, but also to some degree in Asia and Latin America, theories and sub-disciplinary formations prosper to the degree that they are disseminated from and sanctioned by elite US universities.
Yet, in those elite universities there are few antidisciplinary pressures, and the traditional humanities remain strong, still in the business of distributing cultural capital to the most favoured social groups or to individuals given the opportunity to join such groups.
So cultural studies has not flourished institutionally in these universities, nor indeed in British or European elite universities. Cultural studies is no longer a marginal field — after all it has risen partly on the logic of neo-liberal governmental policies — but it remains shut out of the highest reaches of the global university system, which are largely protected from those policies.
Nor, of course, does the globalisation of cultural studies mean that it is positioned institutionally in the same way around the world, although most Anglophone accounts fail to register this sufficiently see Stratton and Ang In Asia, culture is studied largely in language or social science departments see Yudice , — This is one reason that in Asia especially cultural studies work depends more heavily on non- or quasi-academic settings than it does in, say, Britain.
And also where academic secularity is less taken for granted. In continental Europe itself, cultural studies, when thought of as the politically engaged study of culture, especially popular culture, is not as well established as it is in the Anglophone world.
There, the use of cultural hierarchies to supplement economic hierarchies in the articulation of class structures best described by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu in his classic Distinction remains too well entrenched. The post-war triumph of social welfarism across the European continent, along with the perceived threat of American cultural domination has meant that cultural values have not been the object of contest that they have been in the USA and UK.
In Europe, anti-Americanism also plays its part in preventing academic disciplines asserting an affirmative relation to commercial culture. More specifically, in Germany critical theory, aimed primarily at critiquing capitalist culture, dominates; and in France the stand-off between speculative as represented by Jean Baudrillard and critical, empirical approaches to culture as represented by Bourdieu seems to delimit the field.
So although French theorists have provided cultural studies with core concepts and methods, the discipline has not flourished in France. But I will have more to say about differences in cultural studies globally in sections to come. Before that we need to have a stronger sense of the enterprise culture which is taking charge of globalising processes across the board. As already noted, those conditions are not quite adequately described in the often-told epic story of heroic dissident British intellectuals Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall, the Birmingham school battling for democratisation against elitism and hegemony in the sixties and seventies.
After all we have begun to see how university managerialism finds common cause with cultural studies. And to see how cultural studies is entwined with a new configuration of capitalist culture. But we need now to examine more carefully what that configuration — which I will call enterprise culture — actually is. Enterprise culture is associated first with a rapid increase in the social presence of culture, economically, governmentally and conceptually — its positive re-weighting, as stock analysts might say.
Certainly the percentage of workers in cultural industries has increased markedly over the past decades, in Australia, for instance, by 23 per cent in the nineties alone. In most places in the world, every decade and sometimes every year there are, in relation to population growth, more television channels broadcasting longer hours, more movies, more books, more comics, more magazines, more tourist resorts, more lifestyle choices, more commodities sold on the basis of design, more records, more fashion brands, more computer games, more access to the World Wide Web, more sporting events, more celebrities in relation to total population than there ever were before.
This has had a profound impact on old high culture, which has become just another province within this larger field rather than its pinnacle. High culture is increasingly dependent on state subsidies — where it competes both with community arts and its cousin, the avant-garde. It confers less and less status upon its devotees.
So the academic disciplines that provided the skills fully to appreciate and contextualise Eliot, Tintoretto and Mendelssohn lose ground to disciplines which aim rather to provide entry into the cultural industries.
In fact cultural studies often appeals to students for whom the old hierarchy of distinction, by which high culture possessed more cultural capital than popular culture, is not so much wrong and to be resisted as meaningless.
What exactly is this new enterprise culture? In this context, cultural studies is under pressure to present itself as preparing students with the skills required to embark on particular careers and at the same time productively to participate in the culture. From the entrepreneurial as well as from the leftist point of view, it is harder and harder to defend academic training as a site of scholarship for its own sake or as the preserver of received cultural standards.
From the perspective of entrepreneurialism, academic study too seems to be a branch of the business of culture. At another level, enterprise culture emphasises a set of specific personal and ethical qualities: self-sufficiency, appetite for risk, individualism, creativity and sense of adventure as well as self-control, financial expertise and management skills.
It belongs to the world of work, which, especially in its salaried forms, is now saturated in culture also. The enterprise-culture ethic covers an accounting career almost as well as it does one in the arts, property or even academia. And this emphasis on culture allows individual workers to accept specific protocols e. But that paradigm risks losing sight of what attracts people into enterprise culture: not just the promise of reward behind which lies the fear of failure , but the excitement of a challenge, the enticement of self-responsibility.
No easy political judgement of entrepreneurial culture is possible. The arguments that it creates new subjects who possess less capacity for resistance or criticism of society as a whole than did the social welfare or liberal ideologies that entrepreneurialism has largely replaced, or that it masks a radical increase in employment insecurity and burn-out, or that it is mainly addressed to the relatively rich, while true, do not end the story.
Entrepreneurialism has encouraged admittedly mainly relatively rich people to bring their talents to market and, more specifically, has enabled the increase of cultural activity since the eighties. In the UK it has eased access to cultural industries and other workplaces for those from outside the Oxbridge axis partly because training in these fields is relatively cheap, and there exist fewer barriers to entry than to the professions ; it has increased options about how and when to work; it has required creative workers to take their audiences and their requirements increasingly seriously.
It has its own utopianism since it proposes a society of energetic individuals, both supportive of as consumers and competitive with as producers one another, fulfilling their personal dreams. And no less to the point, in the arts it is not as though it has been destructive of an older system in which quality was systematically higher. Of course there exist exceptions to this, such as British television, where the move into outsourcing of product and a greater attention to ratings even at the BBC has led to the production of less well-thought-out and original programming, according to its own audiences.
In enterprise culture, cultural industries are routinely regarded as economic contributors, as employers, as attractors of tourism and business, as agents in urban regeneration, for instance.
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Hobbies can quickly turn into small businesses, often with support from government agencies encouraging entrepreneurialism. Jobs in arts administration and project management, whose aim is to drum up business for cultural enterprises, proliferate.
Culture is regarded as a means through which governments can manage different communal values and traditions in society Bennett , So, for example, multiculturalism became official policy in Australia during the s while Mrs Thatcher mandated Shakespeare on the British school curriculum in the same decade.
Once again it is possible to exaggerate the newness of this: in eighteenth-century London the economic benefits of a healthy theatre were often remarked upon, and government regulated the field and censored product much more stringently than today. Culture wars If entrepreneurialism has become the dominant cultural mode over the past twenty years or so, at least in the West but not only — think of Singapore , and has begun to incorporate cultural studies into itself via the enterprise university, this does not mean that all other senses of culture have withered away.
But two other moments in which culture is conceptualised in different terms than it is in enterprise culture are worth drawing attention to immediately.
For him, cultures are inherited and more or less immutable. Each society has a single culture. Each individual is wholly shaped by the single culture that they inherit. It is the very opposite of the mobile, fluid, market-directed, entrepreneurial, globalised culture that I have been invoking and to which contemporary cultural studies belongs.
An account such as that of Huntington, which traps us into sealed traditions whose relation to one another is finally marked by incomprehension and suspicion, helps to reveal the progressive force in the cultural-studies and entrepreneurial concept of a mobile, fluid, commercialised culture.
In fact there have been various culture wars, of which we can usefully distinguish three. The second is centred on the risks to traditional heritage and cultural value posed by commercial culture. And the third is focussed on the threat to consensus and unified heritage implied by multiculturalism and migration.
We might add a fourth culture war, fought daily almost everywhere outside the USA: that between Americanisation and its enemies. Each of these debates will be dealt with in more detail in the chapters that follow, though it is important to note that they are not simply different fronts of one war — there are many migrant proponents of multiculturalism, for instance, who oppose permissiveness.
But the point that it is important to make here is that just as Huntington replaces questions of political and economic dominance with questions of culture in the realm of geopolitics, the conservative side in these various culture wars places questions of culture at centre stage inside the nation-state. It is as if, as political differences between the left and the right on traditional issues — welfarism and economic policy for instance — shrink, culture is thrust forward in its place as a stake for divisive debate.
It is also as if, when schisms between Christian confessions Protestantism and Catholicism lose their venom, contests over secular culture replace them.
In fact, each of the cultural wars is a response to the rise of enterpreneurialised culture and the decline of culture considered as a set of standards. Again cultural studies has, almost without exception, resisted the conservative side in each of these fronts, in another example of its connection simultaneously to enterprise culture and to progressivism.
I have been writing so far mainly as if cultural studies was unified, even if it lacks a unifying method. As we have begun to see, different nations have developed different kinds of cultural studies. But there have also developed different cultural—political positions, different intellectual trajectories, different disciplinary alliances and different accounts of the cultural studies intellectual.
Among these different forms, let me at once distinguish three national inflections of Anglophone cultural studies — British,American and Australian. My reasons are, sadly, pragmatic and reflect political and commercial realities as much as intellectual ones.
I do want to argue for British cultural studies having a particular importance to the field. To argue otherwise is merely wishful thinking. Most of all it was in the UK that culture became defined as simultaneously a way of life, a set of texts and an instrument of social division.
But it is important to remember that cultural studies in Britain emerged from a Centre at the University of Birmingham funded by the owner of Penguin Books, which was at that time popularising quality literature and which was first headed up by Richard Hoggart, whose The Uses of Literacy became one rallying-point for the new field.
At this point cultural studies was in dialogue with a form of literary criticism developed by F. Leavisism as it was called asserts that language contains residual meanings that have not been wholly incorporated into debased modern commercial culture; it retains trace elements able to express more communal and harmonious ways of living. In a word, language remains a bulwark against modern mechanisation Mulhern , For Leavis, this was most true of literary language, so that literary criticism, based on immersion in great literature, was the strongest basis for cultural critique — however puzzling such a view might seem to us today.
It was Raymond Williams who rejected the notion that literary language contains this kind of ethical capital and turned attention away from literature to culture. He showed how, in the period between Edmund Burke and Leavis i. This marks the key moment in the emergence of British cultural studies. Eliot, now given a radical twist, that would be developed further by Williams in his next book, The Long Revolution , but also, misguidedly as it turned out, that working-class solidarity might create its own democratic variation of high culture against capitalist, market-orientated modernity.
Against that,Williams argued that shifts in economic structures cannot explain shifts in cultural organisation and content in anything like the requisite amount of detail.
Cultural forms and events are more various, the specific possibilities available to cultural workers more abundant than any reference to economic foundations can account for. And finally,Williams decried the separation of the base from the superstructure as such. For him, both are aspects of a larger social whole that continually interact with one another and constantly mutate.
For Gramsci, hegemony helped to explain why class conflict was not endemic despite the fact that power and capital were so unevenly distributed and the working class in Italy, particularly the southern peasantry led such confined lives.
Gramsci argued that the poor partly consented to their oppression because they shared certain cultural dispositions with the rich.
Crucially, it offered the promise, and sometimes the opportunity, for change.
Hegemony was bound to beliefs and passions so deep as to form the very substance of a practice of life. The struggle between Gramscianism and structuralism gradually dissolved during the eighties. This is the kind of model I invoke in slightly different terms above. In this model, particular interactions between social and cultural fields are local, and need not have implications for society as a whole.
Rather, each interaction has power effects insofar as it conditions individual lives. Furthermore, individuals have a number of different, often mutable identities rather than a single fixed identity, and this spread of identities, and the occasions for invention and recombination that it throws up, form a ground for political and cultural agency.
Indeed, leaving this particular theory aside, the understanding of individual and communal agency shifted over the years. Take as an example a relatively early work from the Birmingham school such as the collectively written Policing the Crisis Hall et al.
This showed that the media panic around a mugging in Handsworth by a young black man helped the state to inaugurate policies that controlled not so much crime but black male youth as such. Here black youth were seen as subjects of ideology, policing, media scares and so on, rather than as players negotiating and opposing dominant forces in the social field. This vision of victim passivity was to change in cultural studies of the eighties, when individuals came to be regarded as agents rather than as subjects of larger ideological and social structures.
Ethnography takes two forms. However this kind of research ultimately belongs more to social sciences than to cultural studies. By and large British and Australian cultural studies turned to this latter form of ethnography in the late seventies, in a move that marks its most profound break with predominantly textual and archival humanities disciplines such as literary criticism and social theory. At first, cultural-studies ethnography concentrated on how audiences of varying class, gender or ethnicity accepted or rejected the political slant of news programmes and the like.
But partly because it soon became clear that the lessprivileged members of society often preferred conservative programmes, it moved on to the impact of television, reading, music, etc. By the nineties, much British cultural studies ethnography involved reporting on fans of particular genres, by researchers who were themselves fans as well as academics — in a word, organic intellectuals for taste subcultures.
While the trajectory of British cultural studies remains especially important to cultural studies, because it was in the UK that the contemporary field was first institutionally defined, it is fair to say that British cultural studies has now become just another province of global cultural studies.
And it is now limited in particular by its increasing focus on Britain itself. As the discipline has globalised, and as universalising theories have become increasingly difficult to sustain, British cultural studies has tended to retreat into the culture of its own nation-state.
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US cultural studies Cultural studies has come to mean something rather different in the USA than in Britain, although versions of British cultural studies have been and are pursued in the USA, notably by James Carey from within mass communications , by Lawrence Grossberg and, from within American Studies, by George Lipsitz whose career begins in the labour movement see Carey and ; Grossberg ; Lipsitz Perhaps the most convincing effort has been that by Michael Denning, who attempted to corral the legacy of thirties Popular Front intellectuals for cultural studies, thinkers who certainly were crucial to the development of post-war American studies Denning , — It is also possible to show that early twentieth-century pragmatists such as John Dewey paid serious and progressive attention to the relation with lived culture and social justice and actively sought to build institutions to expand cultural horizons among workers.
This task was further developed by Marxian sociologists such as C. Wright Mills whose doctoral thesis was on Deweyian pragmatism. This left-wing intellectual tradition continued to influence figures such as the seminal feminist Betty Friedan, who emerged from the labour movement in the sixties and whose work feeds into cultural studies as we know it today. On a different track one could also make a strong case to bring the African American leader W. Du Bois into the stream of American cultural studies via sixties blackpower intellectuals such as Le Roi Jones.
Or, finally, there were writers such as Robert Warshow, Manny Farber and Parker Tyler, who treated popular culture and especially the movies much more sympathetically than the Partisan Review crowd and who became mediators between journalism and the growing academic field of American Studies.
The fact is that the forms of analysis developed by Williams and Hall drawing upon work by Gramsci, Michel de Certeau, Althusser, Foucault, etc. While cultural studies in the USA can mean the study of popular culture, Rey Chow has argued that four rather different topics have been especially important in marking it out as American see Chow , 2—4.
In Britain and Australia such topics would as likely as not fall under a different disciplinary rubric. They might well be thought of as belonging to postcolonialism, multiculturalism or, perhaps, ethnic studies rather than simply to cultural studies.
In the USA cultural studies is less obsessed with America itself than British cultural studies is obsessed with Britain, perhaps because the USA is a global power and attracts more staff and students internationally.
These regions are supposed to form roughly discrete and coherent unities requiring development. Cultural studies, which emphasises the mobility of, and interactions between, different cultures, and which attempts to speak from below, productively problematises area studies even when it enters into dialogue with them — a problematisation that has been debated most effectively in journals such as Public Culture.
Nonetheless the preponderance of area studies, along with the hierarchical nature of the US university system which is less state-managed than in most other countries, has helped sideline cultural studies there. Australian cultural studies Australian cultural studies emerges out of British rather than US cultural studies.
It was imported by a stream of young British academics who went to Australia looking for jobs in the late seventies and early eighties Tony Bennett, John Fiske, John Hartley, Colin Mercer and David Saunders among others. As it turned out, cultural studies went on to be more successful in the Australian academic system than in any other.
This has meant that its claim to radical political value has been harder to maintain: it has quickly been normalised there.
In this light Australian cultural studies carried out the work of demystification not dissimilar to that of older Marxian theories which placed class at the heart of all social formations and critiqued images of reconciled or unified culture as illusory, as products of false consciousness.
Whatever the case in the early nineties, it is hard to see it like that now, despite important work on migrant culture being produced by for instance Ien Ang and Ghassan Hage and a new generation of indigenous intellectuals — Tony Birch, Marcia Langton and Philip Morrissey for instance — who are articulating new understandings of contemporary aboriginal culture consequent to pioneering work by Stephen Muecke and Eric Michaels whose Bad Aboriginal Art remains essential reading for anyone working in the field anywhere see Muecke ; Michaels Given this it seems natural to ask: if a discrete and stable set of methods do not characterise cultural studies, and if culture is so totalising and fluid a concept, where does cultural studies find its centre of gravity?
At this point cultural studies was in dialogue with a form of literary criticism developed by F. And no less to the point, in the arts it is not as though it has been destructive of an older system in which quality was systematically higher.
Rather, each interaction has power effects insofar as it conditions individual lives. E-mail: frudiger ig. The fetishism related to the goods that is underlying it all may even be more degraded than what is imposed until now through the cultural industry. The notion that the amount and specialisation of culture- and knowledge-prodution had made a single and comprehensive overview of society impossible was already commonplace in the eighteenth century see Barrell
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